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Abstract—Physical-layer key generation (PKG) in multi-user
massive MIMO networks faces great challenges due to the large
length of pilots and the high dimension of channel matrix. To
tackle these problems, we propose a novel massive MIMO key
generation scheme with pilot reuse based on the beam domain
channel model and derive close-form expression of secret key
rate. Specifically, we present two algorithms, i.e., beam-domain
based channel probing (BCP) algorithm and interference neutral-
ization based multi-user beam allocation (IMBA) algorithm for
the purpose of channel dimension reduction and multi-user pilot
reuse, respectively. Numerical results verify that the proposed
PKG scheme can achieve the secret key rate that approximates
the perfect case, and significantly reduce the dimension of the
channel estimation and pilot overhead.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secret key generation,
multi-user massive MIMO, beam domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth generation (5G) and beyond communication sys-
tems have been developing at an unprecedented speed to meet
the requirement of high data rate and low latency. In the 5G
networks, the random access from tons of devices makes tra-
ditional cryptographic key distribution and management very
challenging. Under this background, the physical-layer key
generation (PKG) has emerged as an alternative technique to
establish the symmetric key for cryptographic applications [1].
PKG can generate time-varying key with a lightweight algo-
rithm from the channel randomness. Thanks to the channel
decorrelation property, there is no information leakage to
eavesdroppers, when they are located half a wavelength away
or more from legitimate users [2].
The 5G networks employ massive MIMO technology to
support extremely high throughput and multi-user access.
However, traditional pairwise PKG method is difficult to scale
to the new scenario due to the high dimension of channel
matrix caused by massive MIMO antennas and the huge
number of orthogonal pilot overhead to distinguish multiple
users [1]. Jiao et al. proposed to use new channel charac-
teristics, i.e., virtual angle of arrival (AoA) and angle of
departure (AoD), to generate a shared secret key for pairwise
users in a massive MIMO system [3]. However, they only
considered the PKG between two legitimate users. Generating
secret keys between a base station and multiple users has been
a largely under explored domain [4]. Several work studied the
group PKG protocols, where all users in the group negotiate
a common key based on their channel estimates. But the
majority of them still perform channel probing in a pairwise
manner, resulting in an extremely large overhead and low
efficiency. Hence, those works related to PKG among multiple
nodes through the optimization of probing rates at individual
node pair and channel probing schedule do not scale in this
context. Exceptionally, Zhang et al. designed a multi-user key
generation protocol by leveraging the multi-user access of
OFDMA modulation, which is achieved by assigning non-
overlapping subcarriers to different users [5]. However, no
work has been devoted to exploiting the spatial diversity of
massive MIMO to enable multi-user key generation.
In summary, it is still missing how to generate secret keys
among multiple users in massive MIMO networks, which is
tackled in this paper. The main contributions are as follows:
• We propose a channel dimension reduction approach by
exploiting the spatial sparse property of the beam domain
channel model. Employing this approach, legitimate users
only need to estimate the effective channels at a few
dominant beams, which allows us to reduce the dimension
of channel estimation significantly.
• We propose a muti-user pilot reuse approach that can
largely reduce the pilot overhead compared with using
orthogonal signals. Furthermore, we present a novel al-
gorithm to design the precoding and receiving matrices,
with the purpose of achieving the perfect secret key rate.
• Numerical results verify that the approach can achieve
the secret key rate that approximates the perfect case
and significantly reduce the dimension of the channel
estimation and the pilot overhead.
II. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH MU MASSIVE MIMO
A. System Model and Problem Statement
This paper considers a narrow-band star topology network,
where a base station (BS) simultaneously generates secret keys
κ = {κ1, κ2, · · · , κK} with K user terminals (UT), as shown
Fig. 1. System model of multi-user secret key generation.
in Fig. 1. The BS is equipped with M antennas and the k-th
UT is equipped with Nk antennas. We consider the potential
unintended hearing from other UTs and the active attacks are
out of scope in this paper.
It is challenging for existing pairwise PKG approach to
scale to multi-user massive MIMO scenarios due to two main
reasons as follows.
1) High dimension of the channel matrix: The elements of
the generated secret keys are highly auto-correlated due
to the spatial correlation of the antennas, which must
be reduced by decorrelation preprocessing algorithms.
However, in a multi-user massive MIMO network, the
high dimension of channel matrix makes it too compli-
cated to perform the decorrelation preprocessing algo-
rithms such as principal component analysis.
2) Large pilot overhead: The length of uplink pilots scales
with the number of antennas as well as the number
of UTs. Thus, in the massive MIMO network where
the number of antennas is extremely large, it brings
in large length of pilots to distinguish different users,
while it is hard to accomplish channel probing within the
coherence time in a time division duplex (TDD) system.
B. Scheme Framework
The proposed framework for multi-user PKG is portrayed in
Fig. 2. It contains four steps, namely channel probing, quan-
tization, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification.
The last three steps are similar with existing work summarized
in [1], so this paper will focus on the first step, i.e., channel
probing, which is relatively different from that in the point-to-
point PKG. To address the two challenges mentioned above,
the proposed channel probing scheme contains two novel parts,
i.e., channel dimension reduction and multi-user pilot reuse.
1) Channel dimension reduction: In the massive MIMO
channel matrix, only a few dominant elements contain
the most relevant channel information. So we employ
the beam domain channel model where the channel gains
are concentrated in a few beams. In order to significantly
reduce the dimension of the channel estimation, a beam-
domain based channel probing (BCP) algorithm is pro-
Fig. 2. Framework of secret key generation scheme in the multi-user massive
MIMO network.
posed to obtain the CSI. This scheme will be presented
in Section III.
2) Multi-user pilot reuse: In order to reduce the pilot
overhead in massive MIMO network, we consider pilot
reuse among the UTs, where different UTs transmit the
identical pilot signals. With the purpose of mitigating the
inter-user interference, we then present an interference
neutralization based beam allocation algorithm (IMBA)
to then proposed to design the precoding and receiving
matrix. This algorithm will be discussed further in
Section IV.
III. CHANNEL DIMENSION REDUCTION APPROACH
A. Beam-domain Channel Model
We consider a narrow-band multipath channel model. The
downlink channel response of the k-th UT can be given as
H
DL
k =
NP∑
p=1
H
DL
k,p =
NP∑
p=1
αk,paUT,k(θk,p)a
H
BS(ϕk,p). (1)
where NP is the number of paths,H
DL
k,p is the downlink chan-
nel matrix associated with the p-th path of k-th UT [6], αk,p is
the complex gain of the p-th path, aUT,k(θk,p) and aBS(ϕk,p)
are the antenna array response vectors at the UT and BS with
AoA θk,p and AoD ϕk,p, respectively. Specifically, under the
uniform linear array (ULA) setup, these vectors are given by
aUT,k(θk,p) =
1√
Nk
[
1, e−jΘk,p , . . . , e−j(Nk−1)Θk,p
]T
aBS(ϕk,p) =
1√
M
[
1, e−jΦk,p , . . . , e−j(M−1)Φk,p
]T
, (2)
where Θk,p =
2pi
λ d sin(θk,p), Φk,p =
2pi
λ d sin(ϕk,p), λ is
the wavelength, and d is the distance between the adjacent
antennas.
Beam domain model samples the original physical channel
by two series of uniformly distributed beams/angles over
[0, 2pi], i.e., transmitting and receiving beams/angles. Accord-
ing to [7], the downlink beam domain channel response is
H˜
DL
k = A
H
UT,kH
DL
k ABS , (3)
where AUT,k = [aUT,k(θ1), aUT,k(θ2), . . . , aUT,k(θNk)] ∈
CNk×Nk and ABS = [aBS(ϕ1), aBS(ϕ2), . . . , aBS(ϕM )] ∈
CM×M are the sampling matrices at the k-th UT and the
BS, respectively. The (n,m)-th element of H˜DLk represents
the channel gains from AoD ϕm to AoA θn, where ϕm and
θn are the m-th and n-th sample angles, which satisfy that
sin(ϕm) = 2m/M − 1 and sin(θn) = 2n/Nk − 1.
Proposition 1: When the number of antennas grows to
infinity, the (n,m)-th element of beam domain channel H˜DLk
tends to [7]
lim
M,Nk→∞
(
[H˜DLk ]n,m −
NP∑
p=1
αk,pδ(θk,p − arcsin(2n/Nk − 1))
× δ(ϕk,p − arcsin(2m/M − 1))
)
= 0. (4)
The beam domain channel covariance matrices R˜BS,k =
E{(H˜DLk )HH˜DLk } and R˜UT,k = E{H˜DLk (H˜DLk )H} tend to
diagonal matrices with the diagonal elements given by
lim
M→∞
[R˜BS,k ]m,m −
NP∑
p=1
|αk,p|
2δ(ϕk,p − arcsin(2m/M − 1)) = 0,
lim
Nk→∞
[R˜UT,k]n,n −
NP∑
p=1
|αk,p|
2δ(θk,p − arcsin(2n/Nk − 1)) = 0.
(5)
Remark 1: For each n and m, there is at most one path p si-
multaneously satisfying θk,p = arcsin(2n/Nk−1) and ϕk,p =
arcsin(2m/M − 1), which means that different elements
represent channel gains corresponding to different AoAs and
AoDs. With a large (but finite) number of antennas, H˜DLk is a
very sparse matrix with NP dominant elements corresponding
to the paths. Moreover, these elements become independent
with each other as long as these paths are independent. The
m-th diagonal element in R˜BS,k represents the channel gains
of the m-th transmit beam (ϕk,p = arcsin(2m/M − 1)), and
the n-th diagonal element in R˜UT,k represents the channel
gains of the n-th receive beam (θk,p = arcsin(2n/N − 1)).
B. The BCP Algorithm
In this section, we assume the precoding and receiving
matrices have been provided, the algorithm of designing these
matrices will be presented later in Section V.
In this stage, BS and UTs probe the channel alternatively
and employ the precoding and receiving matrix to construct
the reciprocal channel characteristics. Firstly, the BS transmits
the downlink pilot signals by the precoding matrix P and UTs
preprocess the received signals by the receiving matrix CH
to obtain the reciprocal channel parameters. Next, each UT
employs the matrix C∗ to transmit the pilot signals. The BS
utilizes the matrix PT to preprocess the received signals and
estimate the effective channel.
Based on the analysis above, we propose a BCP algorithm,
which is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
C. Signal Presentation
In the downlink transmission, define the downlink pilot from
BS to UT k within TD time slots as S
DL
k ∈ CMe×TD , where
Me is the dimension of the effective channel at the BS. To
estimate the perfect CSI, the pilot signals of each UT are
orthogonal. Based on the BCP algorithm, the downlink CSI
estimated at UT k side is
Z
DL
k = C
H
k H
DL
k
∑
k′
Pk′S
DL
k′ (S
DL
k )
H +CHk Nk(S
DL
k )
H . (6)
In the uplink transmission, define the pilot transmitted
by UT k within TU time slot as S
UL
k ∈ CNe×TU , which
satisfies SULk′ (S
UL
k )
H = I. Employing the BCP algorithm, the
estimated uplink CSI of UT k can be expressed as
Z
UL
k = P
T
k
∑
k′
H
UL
k′ C
∗
k′S
UL
k′ (S
UL
k )
H +PTkN(S
UL
k )
H . (7)
Algorithm 1 BCP algorithm.
Require: Pk and Ck
Ensure: zULk and z
DL
k
1: In the downlink:
2: At the BS side:
3: for k = 1 : K do
4: Multiply the downlink pilot signals SDLk to UT k by
the precoding matrix Pk .
5: end for
6: Transmit the summation of all processed signals to UTs.
7: At the UT side:
8: for k = 1 : K do
9: UT k multiplies received signal by the receiving
matrix CHk and employ the LS estimation to estimate the
downlink CSI ZDLk .
10: Vectorize the estimated effective channel matrices
Z
DL
k as z
DL
k = vec(Z
DL
k )
11: end for
12: In the uplink:
13: At the UT side:
14: for k = 1 : K do
15: Multiply the uplink pilot signals SULk to the BS by the
matrix C∗k.
16: Transmit the summation of all processed signals to the
BS.
17: end for
18: At the BS side:
19: for k = 1 : K do
20: Multiply received signal by the matrix PTk and employ
the LS estimation to estimate the uplink CSI ZULk .
21: Vectorize the estimated effective channel matrices
Z
UL
k as z
UL
k = vec(Z
UL
k )
22: end for
Remark 2: In the uplink and downlink transmissions, the BS
and UTs vectorize the estimated effective channel matrices as
z
DL
k = vec(Z
DL
k ) and z
UL
k = vec((Z
UL
k )
T ) to generate the
secret key. As the uplink and downlink channels are reciprocal,
the downlink channel HDLk is denoted as Hk, and the uplink
channel is HULk = (Hk)
T . The reciprocal component between
the BS and UT k is CHk HkPk with a small dimension of
Ne×Me. In this way, the dimension of channel characteristics
is reduced by η = M×NkNe×Me times. The dimensions of Me and
Ne are very small compared with the number of antennas,
therefore the dimension can be significantly reduced.
D. Secret Key Rate
This paper considers the condition that the beam domain
channel between one UT and the BS is independent of that
between one UT and another UT. Thus, the secret key rate
is the minimum mutual information between zDLk and z
UL
k ,
which can be expressed as Ik = I(z
DL
k ; z
UL
k ). Denote the
precoding and receiving matrices in the beam domain as
P˜k = A
H
BSPk and C˜k = A
H
UT,kCk, respectively. Let Vk =
Λ
1/2
k
(∑
k′(P˜k′ )
T ⊗C˜Hk
)H
and Vkk′ = Λ
1/2
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗C˜Hk′
)H
,
where Λk = E{vec(H˜k)vec(H˜k)H} is the full correlation of
the beam domain channel.
Theorem 1: When the channel of different UTs are inde-
pendent, according to [7], we can compute the secret key rate
of UT k as
Ik =− logdet
(
I−Vkk
(∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′ +
(
P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU
))−1
×VHkkVk
(
V
H
k Vk + ITD ⊗CHk Ck
)−1
V
H
k
)
. (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
IV. MULTI-USER PILOT REUSE APPROACH
A. Pilot Reuse for Multi-users
According to (8), when the pilot signals of each UT are
orthogonal, there is no inter-user interference and the estimated
CSI achieves the perfect case. The pilot overhead is defined as
the length of the total pilot signals. For traditional approach
using the orthogonal pilot, the pilot overhead is given by
TTA = M +
K∑
k=1
Nk. (9)
However, as TTA scales with the number of antennas and
users, the overhead of orthogonal signals is extremely large
in the multi-user massive MIMO network. Therefore, we
consider the key generation scheme under the pilot reuse case,
where different UTs transmit the identical pilot signals. In the
pilot reuse case, the pilot overhead is reduced to
TPA = Me +Ne. (10)
Since pilot reuse results in interference between UTs and
reduces secret key rate, it is necessary to mitigate the interfer-
ence.
The interference neutralization approach can be employed to
reduce the interference, i.e., for arbitrary matrix C˜k′ (k
′ 6= k),
the precoding matrix P˜k satisfies
(P˜Tk ⊗ C˜Hk′)Λk′ = 0, k′ 6= k. (11)
When the channel beams of different users are non-
overlapping, we have
P˜
H
k R˜BS,k′ = 0, k
′ 6= k. (12)
The constraint of interference neutralization approach can
always be satisfied under this case.
In order to mitigate the interference, the precoding and
receiving matrices must satisfy the interference neutralization
constraint. Therefore, a novel algorithm will be presented to
help design these matrices.
B. The IMBA Algorithm
Referring to Proposition 1, as the number of antennas tends
to infinity, different elements of the beam domain channel
matrix H˜k represent the channel gains from different AoDs
to different AoAs, which indicates that the channel gains
are concentrated in a few beams. Specifically, suppose that
there are NP paths, each corresponding to different AoAs and
AoDs. Then, the BS selects the strongest NP non-overlapping
beams, i.e., the precoding matrix P˜k is given by
P˜k =
[
eηt,k,1 eηt,k,2 · · · eηt,k,NP
]
(13)
where ηt,k,1 is the index of the sorted eigenvalue of ma-
trix RBS,k. Similarly, UT k selects the strongest NP non-
overlapping receiving directions, i.e., the receiving matrix C˜k
is given by
C˜k =
[
eηr,k,1 eηr,k,2 · · · eηr,k,NP
]
(14)
where ηr,k,1 is the index of the sorted eigenvalue of matrix
RUT,k.
Recalling (12), since the BS and UTs all select non-
overlapping beams, the designed precoding and receiving ma-
trices can satisfy the constraint of interference neutralization
approach.
Algorithm 2 IMBA algorithm.
Require: RBS,k and RUT,k
Ensure: Pk and Ck
1: At the BS side:
2: for k = 1 : K do
3: Calculate the beam domain channel covariance matrix
R˜BS,k according to R˜BS,k = E{(H˜DLk )HH˜DLk } .
4: Select the strongest non-overlapping beams P˜k ac-
cording to (13) and (12).
5: Construct the precoding matrix Pk = ABSP˜k.
6: end for
7: At the UT side:
8: for k = 1 : K do
9: Calculate the beam domain channel covariance matrix
R˜UT,k according to R˜UT,k = E{H˜DLk (H˜DLk )H} .
10: Select the strongest beams C˜k according to (14).
11: Construct the receiving matrix Ck = AUT C˜k.
12: end for
The number of paths NP is relatively small, and Me and
Ne can be chosen equal to the number of paths. Using the
precoding and receiving matrices, we can construct P˜∗k ⊗ C˜k
to obtain the N2P elements in Λk, which contains the channel
information of the NP paths. The proposed approach can
largely reduce the pilot overhead and work efficiently in
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Fig. 3. Secret key rate comparison for one UT.
massive MIMO channel model and precoding [8]. Based on
the analysis above, we propose a novel IMBA algorithm,
which is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the simulations, we assume that a BS simultaneously
communicates with K = 6 UTs. The BS is equipped with
M = 128 antennas and each UT is equipped with Nk =
4 antennas. Furthermore, we assume that the BS and UTs
employ ULA with 0.5λ antenna spacing and the number of
channel paths is NP = 6 for each channel between the BS
and UTs. According to (1), we can generate a channel with
randomly distributed AoDs and AoAs.
First, we evaluate the performance of the beam domain
secret key generation scheme in the single user scenario. Fig. 3
presents the secret key rate of single user, confirming that the
proposed scheme can effectively reduce the dimension of the
large channel matrix. The perfect CSI provides the complete
channel information and achieves the highest secret key rate.
We make a comparison between the secret key rate of the
perfect CSI and that of our designed precoding matrices. Here,
we consider Me = 4 and Me = 6 cases. The numerical
results demonstrate that, when Me = 6, the secret key rate of
designed matrices can approach the perfect case. This indicates
that employing the precoding matrix P˜ enables the BS and the
UT to obtain the almost perfect channel information, while
significantly reducing the pilot overhead and the dimension of
channel estimation. When Me = 4, the secret key rate is a
little smaller than that of Me = 6, which contains the most
channel power with lower overhead.
Next, we consider the multi-user secret key generation and
illustrate an example of multi-user channel gains distribution
in the beam domain in Fig. 4. The BS employs 128 antennas
to generate 128 beams with different directions and the beam
index m represents the mth beam with direction sin(ϕm) =
2m/M −1. When 6 UTs are distributed in different positions,
the channel gains of each UT are concentrated within a few
beams, different UTs occupy non-overlapping channel beams.
The attenuation between the adjacent UTs is about 20 dB, sig-
nificantly reducing inter-user interference. This result indicates
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that the BS equipped with massive antennas has the potential
to achieve multi-user secret key generation.
Fig. 5 compares the pilot overhead of traditional and pro-
posed approaches multi-user secret key generation. We observe
that due to the large number of antennas at the BS, the
traditional overhead TTA is extremely large, meanwhile the
overhead also scales with the number of UTs. In contract, the
overhead of proposed approach with pilot reuse TPA remains
the same and is significantly lower than that of the traditional
approach. This result demonstrates the desirable performance
of the proposed approach in reducing pilot overhead.
Since the bottleneck is the pilot overhead in massive MIMO
network, we must compare the secret key rate as well as the
pilot overhead. Therefore, we define the unit secret key rate as
Runit = Rsum/T , where T (TTA or TPA) is the pilot overhead,
scaled with the dimension of the effective channel Me and
Ne. As the number of antennas at each UT is 4, we set Ne =
Nk = 4. Fig. 6 compares the unit secret key rate of reused
pilot with Me = 4 and Me = 6 with orthogonal pilot scheme.
The unit secret key rate in orthogonal pilot schemes suffers
serious loss due to its extremely large pilot overhead. The
reused pilot scheme with Me = 6 achieves the highest rate
and the scheme with Me = 4 is close to that of Me = 6.
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Fig. 6. Secret key rate comparison for multiple UTs of orthogonal pilot and
reused pilot.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a design and analysis of the multi-user
secret key generation in massive MIMO wireless communi-
cations. Exploiting the sparse property of the beam domain
channel model, we proposed a channel dimension reduction
algorithm named BCP to significantly reduce the dimension
of the channel estimation. Furthermore, we presented a novel
algorithm named IMBA which designs the precoding and
receiving matrices to support multi-user key generation. Nu-
merical results demonstrated the performance improvement of
our proposed multi-user secret key generation scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We assume zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector
for each channel observation zDLk or z
UL
k . When the channel
observations of different UTs are uncorrelated, we have [9]
Ik = I(z
DL
k ; z
UL
k ) = log
det(R
z
DL
k
R
z
UL
k
)
det(R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
)
, (15)
which only depends on the correlation of uplink and downlink
channels.
Let Rk = E{vec(Hk)vec(Hk)H} be the full correlation of
the channel matrix. We can calculate R
z
DL
k
as
R
z
DL
k
=
∑
k′
((Pk′ )
T ⊗CHk )Rk
∑
k′
((Pk′ )
T ⊗CHk )H
+ (ITD ⊗CHk Ck). (16)
Note that Rk can be decomposed as Rk = (A
∗
BS ⊗
AUT )Λk(A
∗
BS ⊗ AUT )H . Let P˜k = AHBSPk, C˜k =
A
H
UT,kCk, Vk = Λ
1/2
k
(∑
k′ (P˜k′)
T ⊗ C˜Hk
)H
and Vkk′ =
Λ
1/2
k′
(
P˜
T
k ⊗ C˜Hk′
)H
. The covariance matrix R
z
DL
k
can be
rewritten as
R
z
DL
k
= VHk Vk + (ITD ⊗CHk Ck). (17)
Similarly, we can calculate R
z
UL
k
and R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
as
R
z
UL
k
=
∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′ + (P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU )
R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
=VHk Vkk. (18)
The covariance matrix R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
can be decomposed as
R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
=
[ R
z
DL
k
R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
R
z
UL
k
z
DL
k
R
z
UL
k
.
]
(19)
From the determinant of the block matrix, we have
det(R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
) = det(R
z
DL
k
)
× det
(
R
z
UL
k
−R
z
UL
k
z
DL
k
R−1
z
DL
k
R
z
DL
k
z
UL
k
)
. (20)
Then, the secret key rate can be expressed as
Ik =− logdet
(
I−Vkk
(∑
k′
V
H
kk′Vkk′ +
(
P
T
kP
∗
k ⊗ ITU
))−1
×VHkkVk
(
V
H
k Vk + ITD ⊗CHk Ck
)−1
V
H
k
)
. (21)
This completes the proof. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was supported by the NSFC (61801115), the
Zhishan Youth Scholar Program Of SEU, the Research Fund of
National Mobile Communications Research LaboratorySouth-
east University (No.2019B01) and the Fundamental Research
Funds for the Central Universities (3204009415, 3209019405).
The work of E. Jorswieck is partly funded by the German
Research Foundation (DFG) under project JO 801/21-1. The
work of B. Xiao is partly funded by the NSFC (61772446).
REFERENCES
[1] G. Li, C. Sun, J. Zhang, E. Jorswieck, B. Xiao, and A. Hu, “Physical layer
key generation in 5G and beyond wireless communications: Challenges
and opportunities,” Entropy, vol. 21, no. 5, p. 497, 2019.
[2] E. A. Jorswieck, A. Wolf, and S. Engelmann, “Secret key generation from
reciprocal spatially correlated MIMO channels,” in Proc. IEEE Globecom
Workshops, Atlanta, GA, USA, Jun. 2014, pp. 1–6.
[3] L. Jiao, J. Tang, and K. Zeng, “Physical layer key generation using virtual
AoA and AoD of mmwave massive MIMO channel,” in Proc. IEEE Conf.
Communications and Network Security (CNS), May 2018, pp. 1–9.
[4] J. Zhang, T. Q. Duong, A. Marshall, and R. Woods, “Key generation
from wireless channels: A review,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 614–626,
Mar. 2016.
[5] J. Zhang, M. Ding, D. Lopez-Perez, A. Marshall, and L. Hanzo, “Design
of an efficient ofdma-based multi-user key generation protocol,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 68, no. 9, pp. 8842 – 8852, Sep. 2019.
[6] D. Tse and P. Viswanath, Fundamentals of Wireless Communication.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[7] C. Sun, X. Gao, S. Jin, M. Matthaiou, Z. Ding, and C. Xiao, “Beam divi-
sion multiple access transmission for massive MIMO communications,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 2170–2184, Jun. 2015.
[8] O. E. Ayach, S. Rajagopal, S. Abu-Surra, Z. Pi, and R. W. Heath,
“Spatially sparse precoding in millimeter wave MIMO systems,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1499–1513, March 2014.
[9] J. W. Wallace and R. K. Sharma, “Automatic secret keys from reciprocal
MIMO wireless channels: Measurement and analysis,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 381–392, Sep. 2010.
